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9The Current Economic Crisis and the Welfare State
von Peter A. Hall
What is the significance of the cur-
rent economic crisis for the welfare 
state?  Will the financial crisis and 
economic recession of 2008-2009 
inspire renewed appreciation for 
the value of social safety-nets or 
cut-backs in spending that threaten 
social solidarity?  Only time will tell, 
but it is not too early to make some 
tentative predictions.
We should begin by recognizing that 
the import of the crisis is different 
in different types of political econo-
mies, and not only, as the French 
Finance Minister has said, because 
the welfare states of continental 
Europe have automatic stabilizers la-
cking in the countries Gösta Esping-
Andersen described as liberal welfa-
re states.  Stylizing slightly, we can 
distinguish two very different ‘growth 
models’ in the economic strategies 
of the developed democracies over 
the past two decades.  Especially 
relevant are differences in how they 
resolved two key problems, namely, 
the problem of ensuring adequate 
demand for their products and the 
problem of mobilizing political con-
sent for the neo-liberal policies that 
all have pursued to one degree or 
another over the past two decades. 
The latter is a serious problem be-
cause neo-liberal policies tend to 
increase wage inequality, and so 
cannot be presented as a ‘class 
compromise’ because they deliver 
more obvious benefits to people on 
one side of the class divide than to 
those on the other.
Over the last twenty years, several 
liberal market economies, such as 
the U.S. and the U.K., have emb-
raced models in which economic 
growth is led by consumer demand.  
But this is not easy to accomplish 
when median and below-median in-
comes are stagnating, as they have 
been for more than a decade in the 
United States.  Thus, as Raghuram 
Rajan has observed, the indispen-
sible complement has been financial 
regulations that offered consumers 
cheap credit, to see them through 
adverse life events or fluctuations in 
the economy, and ready access to 
government-guaranteed mortgages 
that fed housing booms, giving many 
people the illusion that their wealth 
was increasing even if their real in-
comes were not.  These measures 
also mobilized consent for neo-libe-
ral policies that on any standard as-
sessment would not seem to benefit 
ordinary voters.  Fueled by the che-
aper credit that entry into European 
monetary union and German export 
surpluses provided, several southern 
European countries also pursued va-
riants of this growth model over the 
past decade.
By contrast, in these years, the 
continental economies of northern 
Europe developed growth models in 
which demand was led by exports 
that were made competitive through 
processes of coordinated wage 
bargaining and incremental inno-
vation.  The varieties-of-capitalism 
literature explains why these political 
economies were well-suited to such 
strategies.  In continental Europe, 
political consent for neo-liberal poli-
cies has been secured in two ways 
over the past twenty years.  On the 
one hand, more generous social 
programs were used to offset the 
effects of rising wage inequality on 
disposable income.  On the other 
hand, measures that began with the 
Single European Act of 1986 turned 
the European Union into an agent for 
market liberalization behind which 
national governments could hide.
At first glance, we might think that 
the fiscal problems generated by 
the recent economic recession 
pose the biggest problems for the 
largest welfare states, such as tho-
se in northern Europe.  With these 
models as a backdrop, however, we 
can see that, paradoxically, just the 
reverse is the case.  The real crisis 
of the welfare state is likely to occur 
in the liberal market economies, for 
two reasons.  First, these countries 
incurred especially high deficits in 
the wake of the crisis in order to re-
vive growth based on longstanding 
models led by consumer demand, 
and thus serious cutbacks may be 
required there to restore fiscal balan-
ce.  Second, the dramatic reductions 
in lending that followed the financial 
crisis have especially severe con-
sequences in economies where the 
well-being of ordinary people has 
depended so heavily on housing 
booms and easy access to credit 
– essentially hidden features of the 
Anglo-American welfare states.  
Thus, it is in the already-residual 
welfare states of the US and Britain 
that social protection and the well-
being of the poor are likely to suffer 
the most in the coming years.
Much the same can be said of 
southern Europe, although sovereign 
debt crises are forcing even more 
immediate and draconian spending 
cuts there, while the effects of the 
crisis on the welfare states of nor-
thern Europe are likely to be less 
substantial.  Even there, efforts to 
restore fiscal balance will eat into so-
cial benefits, but export-led growth 
should ease the pain, and, in most of 
these countries, ordinary people are 
less dependent on consumer lending 
to sustain their well-being.
What might the long-term effects of 
the crisis be on political support for 
the welfare state?  At first glance, 
we might expect that support to rise, 
since the negative socioeconomic 
impact of the crisis would have been 
much greater were it not for the so-
cial safety-nets that welfare states 
now provide, and the failure of many 
market-oriented policies that the 
crisis revealed might be expected to 
revive interest in more interventionist 
policies.  In some countries where 
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the crisis is especially severe, that 
might happen.
On the whole, however, there are 
several reasons to expect a more 
muted response, marked by a 
reluctance to increase the role of the 
state in the economy.  First, despite 
the examples of Franklin D. Roose-
velt and the Swedish social de-
mocrats often cited today, there is no 
Say’s law in politics: economic crisis 
does not automatically call forth poli-
tical mobilization on the left. History 
teaches us that economic downturns 
are just as likely to inspire a nativist 
response, characterized by increa-
sing hostility to immigrants and rising 
support for the radical right.  Second, 
ordinary people do not simply blame 
markets for economic crises: they also 
blame governments.   Still influenced 
by a Keynesian era that is otherwise 
past, they hold governments respon-
sible for rising unemployment.  Virtu-
ally every government in power during 
the deep recession of the 1970s was 
turned out of office at the next elec-
tion.  Across Europe and America, 
distrust in government has been rising 
for more than a decade.  People want 
relief from the crisis, but they do not 
necessarily think that more interventi-
onist governments can provide it.
These factors go some distance to-
ward explaining both the popularity of 
the Tea Party movement in the United 
States and the fact that the British 
electorate turned out a government 
committed to social justice in favor of 
one committed to fiscal austerity.  Of 
course, the political pendulum is going 
to swing back and forth, but it is not 
necessarily going to turn toward the 
political left.  Much will depend on who 
is currently in power and thus blamed 
for a bitter economic crisis.  
Therefore, in the long run as well as 
the short term, we can expect the 
welfare states of northern Europe to 
endure, despite some marginal adjust-
ments, while those at the margins of 
the labor market in Britain, the U.S., 
Ireland and southern Europe have 
good reason to worry whether their 
already-limited levels of social protec-
tion will survive the fall-out from this 
economic crisis.
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